Syllabus - Market design Room 170 (except for March 12 – room 356) Hour: 18h:20-21h:10

Somouaoga Bonkoungou

This is a 5 seminars course on **Market Design**. We will cover the theory of matching markets and discrete resource allocation with an emphasis on their applications to real-world markets. These are familiar markets such as labor markets, student placement to public schools and kidney exchange programs.

There is no formal requirement for this course. In particular, there is no grading. For a background reading, I recommend the following book.

A. Roth and M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990.

Here is the provisional schedule:

March 4, 2019, Introduction & Two-sided matching theory

References:

• Gale, David, and Shapley, Lloyd, (1962) "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly 69:9-15.

• Roth, Alvin E., (2008) "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," International Journal of Game Theory 36:537-569.

• Roth, Alvin E., and Sotomayor, Marilda, (1990) "Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis," Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1,2,4, 5.

March 6, 2019, Housing market & House allocation

References:

• Ma, Jipeng, (1994) "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory 23:75-83.

• Moulin, Hervé, (1995) "Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction," Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.

• Roth, Alvin E., and Postlewaite, Andrew, (1977) "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics 4:131-137.

• Roth, Alvin E., (1982) "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisibilities", Economics Letters 9:127-132.

• Shapley, Lloyd, and Herbert Scarf (1974), "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics 1:23-28.

• Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (1999), "Strategyproof Allocation of Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare 16:557-567.

March 12, 2019, School Choice: basic theory

References:

• Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Sönmez, Tayfun (2003), "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, 93:729-747.

• Michel Balinski, and Sönmez, Tayfun (1999) "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory 84:73-94.

• Sönmez, Tayfun, (1997) "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory 77:197-204.

• Ergin, Haluk, (2002) "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, 70:2489-2497.

• Ergin, Haluk, and Tayfun Sonmez (2006) "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics 90:215-237.

• Kesten, Onur, (2010) "School choice with consent," Quarterly Journal of Economics 125:1297-1348.

March 13, 2019, School Choice: recent development

References:

• Pathak, Parag, and Tayfun Sönmez, (2008) "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review 98:1636-1652

• Pathak, Parag, and Sönmez, Tayfun, (2013) "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review 103:80-106.

• Erdil, Aytek, and Haluk, Ergin, (2008) "What's the Matter with Tie-Braking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review 98:669-689.

• Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Che, Yeon-Koo, and Yasuda, Yosuke, (2011) "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review 101:399–410.

• Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Che, Yeon-Koo, and Yasuda, Yosuke, (2015) "Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7:1–42.

• Chen, Yan, and Kesten, Onur, (2017) "College and High School Admissions Reforms in China: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy 125:99-139.

March 15, 2019, Kidney exchange

References:

• Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver (2003) "Kidney Exchange" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119:457-488.

• Roth, Alvin E., Sönmez, Tayfun and Ünver, M. Utku, (2005) "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 125:151–188.

• Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver (2007), "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, 97:828-851.