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Regular version of the site

Selected Publications

 

2023

 

 

 

  1. Gusev V. Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem // European Journal of Operational Research. 2023. Vol. 305. No. 1. P. 438-450. doi   
    Abstract Paper
  2.  Vasilyeva E., Romance M., Samoylenko I. Distances in Higher-Order Networks and the Metric Structure of Hypergraphs // Entropy. 2023. Vol. 25. No. 6.   
    Abstract Paper
  3.  Kondratiev A., Yanovskii E., Nesterov A. How Should We Score Athletes and Candidates: Geometric Scoring Rules // Operations Research. 2023. P. 1-19.   
    Abstract Paper
  4. Dietzenbacher B., Kondratev A. Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitions // Management Science. 2023. Vol. 69.No. 6. P. 1-21. doi 
    Abstract Paper
  5. Nesterov A., Minibaev K., Lomakin A. Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students // Economics Letters. 2023.    
    Abstract Paper
  6.  Samoylenko I., Aleja D., Primo E. Why Are There Six Degrees of Separation in a Social Network? // Physical Review X 2023 Vol. 13 No. 2 Article 021032 
    Abstract Paper
  7.  Kuzyutin D., Smirnova N. Sustainable Cooperation in a Bicriteria Game of Renewable Resource Extraction // Mathematics 2023 Vol. 11 No. 6 Article 1497 
    Abstract Paper
  8.  Gusev V. Pure Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Step Pricing Game: Covering a Tourist City with Retail Outlets //Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics 2023 Vol. 17 No. 1 P. 72-85.   
    Abstract Paper
  9.  Kuzyutin D., Smirnova N. A dynamic multicriteria game of renewable resource extraction with environmentally concerned players // Economics Letters. 2023. Vol.226.   
    Abstract Paper


2022

  1. Bogomolnaia A.Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F. On the Fair Division of a Random Object  // Management Science. 2022. Vol. 68. No. 2. P. 1174-1194. doi
    Abstract Paper
  2. Gusev V. Cooperative congestion games: existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure // Optimization Letters. 2022. Vol. 16. No. 9. P. 2787-2801. doi
    Abstract Paper
  3. Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S. Incentives In Matching Markets: Counting And Comparing Manipulating Agents // Theoretical Economics. 2022. P. 1-31. 
    Abstract Paper
  4.  Yanovskaya E. B., Dietzenbacher B. The equal split-off set for NTU-games // Mathematical Social Sciences. 2022. P. 1-7. doi
    Abstract Paper
  5.  Kondratiev A., Nesterov A. Minimal envy and popular matchings // European Journal of Operational Research 2022 Vol. 296 No. 3 P. 776-787 
    Abstract Paper
  6.  Suzdaltsev A.  Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions // Journal of Economic Theory 2022 Vol. 206 Article 105555 
    Abstract Paper

2021

  1. Bednar J., Obersteiner M., Baklanov A., Thomson M., Wagner F., Geden O., Allen M., Hall J. W. Operationalizing the net-negative carbon economy // Nature. 2021. No. 596. P. 377-383.
    Abstract Paper
  2. Bogomolnaia A.Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F. On the Fair Division of a Random Object // Management Science. 2021. P. 1-19.
    Abstract Paper
  3. Baklanov A., Garimidi P., Gkatzelis V., Schoepflin D. Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. P. 5143-5150. 
    Abstract Paper
  4. Ivanov D., Egorov V., Shpilman A. Balancing Rational and Other-Regarding Preferences in Cooperative-Competitive Environments, in: AAMAS'2021: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.: IFAAMAS, 2021. P. 1536-1538. 
    Abstract Paper
  5. Kalinin N. Pattern formation and tropical geometry // Frontiers in Physics. 2020. Vol. 8.
    Abstract Paper
  6. Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S. Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility // Theoretical Economics. 2021. No. 16(3). P. 881-909.
    Abstract Paper
  7. Gusev V. Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure // European Journal of Operational Research. 2021. Vol. 295. No. 3. P. 1180-1188.
    Abstract Paper
  8. Kondratev A.Nesterov A. S. Minimal envy and popular matchings // European Journal of Operational Research. 2021. P. 1-12.
    Abstract Paper
  9. Meir R., Sandomirskiy F., Tennenholtz M. Representative Committees of Peers // Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 2021. Vol. 71. P. 401-429.
    Absract Paper
  10. Ianovski E.Kondratev A. Computing the Proportional Veto Core, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. P. 5489-5496. 
    Abstract Paper
  11. Arieli I., Babichenko Y., Sandomirskiy F., Tamuz O. Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs // Journal of Political Economy. 2021. Vol. 129. No. 9. P. 2546-2594. doi
    Abstract Paper
  12.  Laurent F., Schneider M., Scheller C., Watson J., Li Jiaoyang, Chen Z., Zheng Y., Chan S., Махнев К. И., Svidchenko O.Yegorov V. S.Ivanov D.Shpilman A., Spirovska E., Tanevski O., Nikov A., Grunder R., Galevski D., Mitrovski J., Sartoretti G., Luo Zhiyao, Damani M., Bhattacharya N., Agarwal S., Egli A., Nygren E., Mohanty S. Flatland Competition 2020: MAPF and MARL for Efficient Train Coordination on a Grid World, in: Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.: PMLR, 2021. P. 275-301.
    Abstract Paper
  13. Baklanov A., Garimidi P., Gkatzelis V., Schoepflin D. PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents, in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21).: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. P. 24-30. 
    Abstract Paper
  14. Ben-Porat O., Sandomirskiy F., Tennenholtz M. Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. P. 5176-5184.
    Abstract Paper
  15.  Baklanov A., Garimidi P., Gkatzelis V., Schoepflin D. PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents, in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21).: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. P. 24-30. 
    Abstract Paper
  16.  Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S. Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility  // Theoretical Economics. 2021. No. 16(3). P. 881-909. doi 
    Abstract Paper
  17.  Gusev V. Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure  // European Journal of Operational Research. 2021. Vol. 295. No. 3. P. 1180-1188. doi
    Abstract Paper
    16. Meir R., Sandomirskiy F., Tennenholtz M. Representative Committees of Peers  // Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 2021. Vol. 71. P. 401-429.
    Abstract Paper

2020

  1. Dietzenbacher B., Yanovskaya E. B. Consistency of the equal split-off set // International Journal of Game Theory. 2020. 
    Abstract Paper
  2. Albizuri M.J., Dietzenbacher B., Zarzuelo J.M. Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims // Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 91, 2020, P. 11-17.
    Abstract Paper
  3. Gusev V. The vertex cover game: Application to transport networks // Omega, Volume 97, 2020.
    Abstract Paper
  4. Béal S., Deschamps M., Moulin, H. Taxing congestion of the space commons // Acta Astronautica, Volume 177, 2020, P. 313-319.
    Abstract Paper
  5. Kalinin N., Vershinin M. Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019 // Marine Policy, Volume 122, 2020.
    Abstract Paper
  6. Dietzenbacher B., Estévez-Fernández A., Borm P.,   Hendrickx R .  Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility //  Ann Oper Res,   2020.
    Abstract Paper
  7. Mazalov V., Gusev V. Generating functions and Owen value in cooperative network cover game // Performance Evaluation, Volume 144, 2020.
    Abstract Paper
  8. Arieli I., Babichenko Y., Sandomirskiy F., and Tamuz O. Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs // Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC '20), 2020.
    Abstract Paper


2019
 

  1. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare //  ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation . 2019. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 1-32. doi
  2. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Hendrickx R. A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games // Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2019. P. 1-25. doi   (in press)
  3. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Arantza E. NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle // Review of Economic Design. 2019. P. 1-22. doi 
  4. Kondratev A.Y.Nesterov A. S. Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules // Public Choice. 2019. P. 1-24. doi 
  5. Moulin H., Bogomolnaia A., Aziz H. Fair Mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences // Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'19), 2019. P. 753-781. doi
  6. Moulin H. Fair Division in the Internet Age //   Annual Review of Economics  . 2019. Vol. 11. P. 407-441. doi
  7. Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F.Yanovskaya E. B. Dividing bads under additive utilities //   Social Choice and Welfare  . 2019. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 395-417. doi
  8. Ianovski E., Wilson M. C. Manipulability of consular election rules //   Social Choice and Welfare  . 2019. Vol. 2. No. 52. P. 363-393. doi
  9. Kondratev A., Мазалов В. В. Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory   //    International Journal of Game Theory . 2019. P. 1-27.   doi
  10. Ivanov D.Nesterov A. S. Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach  // Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'19), 2019. doi


2018

  1. Hougaard J., Moulin H.   Sharing the cost of risky projects   // Economic Theory. 2018. Vol. 65. No. 3. P. 663-679. doi
  2. Kreps V. L.Gavrilovich M.   Games with symmetric incomplete information and asymmetric computational resources   //  International Game Theory Review. 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 1-16.   doi
  3. Zseleva A., Flesch J., Vermeulen D. Catch Games - The impact of modeling decisions //   International Journal of Game Theory  . 2018
  4. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare //   ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  . 2018
  5. Zseleva A., Ifrach B., Maglaras C., Scarsini M. Bayesian Social Learning from Consumer Reviews // Operations Research. 2018

 


2017

  1. Bogomolnaia A.,  Moulin H. ,   Sandomirskiy F. ,  Yanovskaya E. B.    Competitive division of a mixed manna  // Econometrica. 2017. Vol. 85. No. 6. P. 1847-1871. doi
  2. Sandomirskiy F. On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values //  Dynamic Games and Applications . 2018. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 180-198. doi
  3. Nesterov A. S. Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms //   Journal of Economic Theory   . 2017. No. 170. P. 145-168. doi
  4. Bogomolnaia A. The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules //   Journal of Public Economic Theory  . 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 271-276.  

 


2016 

  1.  Moulin H.   Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing   // Journal of Economic Theory . 2016. Vol. 162. P. 1-20. doi
  2. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare //   Proceeding of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'16), 2016. doi
  3. Яновская Е. Б.Самоковариантные и согласованные решения кооперативных игр с трансферабельными полезностями // Математическая теория игр и ее приложения. 2016. Т. 8. № 3. С. 100-133.

 


 

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