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Regular version of the site

Selected Publications


1. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare // ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2019. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 1-32. doi  (in press)

2. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Hendrickx R. A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games // Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2019. P. 1-25. doi  (in press)

3. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Arantza E. NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle // Review of Economic Design. 2019. P. 1-22. doi  (in press)

4. Kondratev A., Nesterov A. S. Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules // Public Choice. 2019. P. 1-24. doi  (in press)

5. Moulin H., Bogomolnaia A., Aziz H. Fair Mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences, in: Proceeding of the ACM Conference EC19. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2019. P. 753-781. doi

6. Moulin H. Fair Division in the Internet Age // Annual Review of Economics. 2019. Vol. 11. P. 407-441. doi

7. Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F.Yanovskaya E. B. Dividing bads under additive utilities // Social Choice and Welfare. 2019. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 395-417. doi

8. Ianovski E., Wilson M. C. Manipulability of consular election rules // Social Choice and Welfare. 2019. Vol. 2. No. 52. P. 363-393. doi

9. Kondratev A., Мазалов В. В. Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory //  International Journal of Game Theory . 2019. P. 1-27. doi

10. Ivanov D., Nesterov A. S.    Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach (in EC '19 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2019. doi


1. Hougaard J., Moulin H. Sharing the cost of risky projects // Economic Theory. 2018. Vol. 65. No. 3. P. 663-679. doi

2. Kreps V. L.Gavrilovich M. Games with symmetric incomplete information and asymmetric computational resources // International Game Theory Review. 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 1-16. doi

3. Kalinin N., Guzmán-Sáenz A., Prieto Y., Shkolnikov M., Kalinina V., Lupercio E. Self-organized criticality and pattern emergence through the lens of tropical geometry // Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 2018. Vol. 115. No. 35. P. E8135-E8142. doi

4. A. Yu. KondratevPositional Voting Methods Satisfying the Criteria of Weak Mutual Majority and Condorcet Loser // Automation and Remote Control. 2018. Vol. 79. No. 8. P. 1489-1514. doi

5. Kalinin N., Shkolnikov M. Introduction to tropical series and wave dynamic on them // Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems. 2018. Vol. 38. No. 6. P. 2827-2849. doi

6. Zseleva A., Flesch J., Vermeulen D. Catch Games - The impact of modeling decisions // International Journal of Game Theory. 2018

7. Gavrilovich M. Expressing the statement of the Feit-Thompson theorem with diagrams in the category of finite groups // Archive for Mathematical Logic. 2018

8. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare // ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2018

9. Zseleva A., Ifrach B., Maglaras C., Scarsini M. Bayesian Social Learning from Consumer Reviews // Operations Research. 2018


1. Bogomolnaia A.Moulin H.Sandomirskiy F.Yanovskaya E. B. Competitive division of a mixed manna // Econometrica. 2017. Vol. 85. No. 6. P. 1847-1871. doi

2. Sandomirskiy F. On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values // Dynamic Games and Applications. 2018. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 180-198. doi

3. Nesterov A. S. Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms // Journal of Economic Theory . 2017. No. 170. P. 145-168. doi

4. Kalinin N. Tropical approach to Nagata's conjecture in positive characteristic // Discrete and Computational Geometry. 2017. Vol. 58. No. 1. P. 158-179. doi

5. Bogomolnaia A. The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules // Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 271-276. doi


1. Moulin H. Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing // Journal of Economic Theory . 2016. Vol. 162. P. 1-20. doi

2. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare, in: Proceeding of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation., 2016. doi

3. Яновская Е. Б. Самоковариантные и согласованные решения кооперативных игр с трансферабельными полезностями // Математическая теория игр и ее приложения. 2016. Т. 8. № 3. С. 100-133.



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