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Regular version of the site

International conference "Algorithmic Aspects of Social Choice and Auction Design"

Event ended
The International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making invites to participate in the international conference on "Algorithmic Aspects of Social Choice and Auction Design".
The meeting will have sessions with 12 speakers coming from Computer Science and Microeconomics communities, and a roundtable discussion with Yandex Research about applied problems of economic design faced by Yandex.

Dates: August 09-10, 2018
Place: 3/1-A Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia

Participation is free but registration is mandatory: please follow the link to register.

Organising Committee:
Hervé Moulin (HSE in St. Petersburg, University of Glasgow)
Anna Bogomolnaia (HSE in St. Petersburg, University of Glasgow)
Fedor Sandomirskiy (HSE in St. Petersburg)
Alexander Nesterov (HSE in St. Petersburg)
Constantine Sorokin (HSE in St. Petersburg)

Conference Schedule:  AASCAD Schedule Updated on Aug 5.pdf
AASCAD poster.pdf

Our speakers:

Shahar Dobzinski, Weizmann Institute of Science

From Cognitive Biases to the Communication Complexity of Local Search
Dobzinski Abstract.pdf
Yannai Gonczarowski, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft ResearchThe Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Gonczarowski Abstract.pdf
Jason Hartline, Northwestern UniversityAn End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)
J. Hartline Abstract.pdf
Ron Holzman, Technion - Israel Institute of TechnologyPareto-optimality under impartial culture (joint work with Boris Bukh and Christopher Cox)
Reshef Meir, Technion - Israel Institute of TechnologyProxy Voting: from Better Democracy to Better Crowdsourcing
Meir Abstract.pdf

Hervé Moulin, University of Glasgow, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”

Fair mixing under Dichotomous preferences 
Nisarg Shah, University of TorontoFair and Efficient Collective Decisions
Nisarg Shah Abstract.pdf
Rann Smorodinsky, Technion - Israel Institute of TechnologyIs it Rational to Keep Up with the Kardashians?
Smorodinsky Abstract.pdf
Constantine Sorokin, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions (joint work with E. Winter)
Sorokin Abstract.pdf
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Technion - Israel Institute of TechnologyApproximate Modularity Revisited (joint work with Uri Feige and Michal Feldman)
Alexey Drutsa and Arsenii Vanunts, Research at YandexPricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions: Worst-case and Expectation Optimization
Abstract Drutsa and Vanunts.pdf

If you have any questions please contact the conference manager Xenia Adaeva via xadaeva@hse.ru.