International conference "Algorithmic Aspects of Social Choice and Auction Design"
The meeting will have sessions with 12 speakers coming from Computer Science and Microeconomics communities, and a roundtable discussion with Yandex Research about applied problems of economic design faced by Yandex.
Dates: August 09-10, 2018
Place: 3/1-A Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia
Participation is free but registration is mandatory: please follow the link to register.
Organising Committee:
Hervé Moulin (HSE in St. Petersburg, University of Glasgow)
Anna Bogomolnaia (HSE in St. Petersburg, University of Glasgow)
Fedor Sandomirskiy (HSE in St. Petersburg)
Alexander Nesterov (HSE in St. Petersburg)
Constantine Sorokin (HSE in St. Petersburg)
Conference Schedule: AASCAD Schedule Updated on Aug 5.pdf
AASCAD poster.pdf
Our speakers:
Speaker | Title |
---|---|
Shahar Dobzinski, Weizmann Institute of Science | From Cognitive Biases to the Communication Complexity of Local Search Dobzinski Abstract.pdf |
Yannai Gonczarowski, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research | The Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions Gonczarowski Abstract.pdf |
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University | An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents) J. Hartline Abstract.pdf |
Ron Holzman, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology | Pareto-optimality under impartial culture (joint work with Boris Bukh and Christopher Cox) |
Reshef Meir, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology | Proxy Voting: from Better Democracy to Better Crowdsourcing Meir Abstract.pdf |
Hervé Moulin, University of Glasgow, National Research University “Higher School of Economics” | Fair mixing under Dichotomous preferences |
Nisarg Shah, University of Toronto | Fair and Efficient Collective Decisions Nisarg Shah Abstract.pdf |
Rann Smorodinsky, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology | Is it Rational to Keep Up with the Kardashians? Smorodinsky Abstract.pdf |
Constantine Sorokin, National Research University “Higher School of Economics” | Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions (joint work with E. Winter) Sorokin Abstract.pdf |
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology | Approximate Modularity Revisited (joint work with Uri Feige and Michal Feldman) |
Alexey Drutsa and Arsenii Vanunts, Research at Yandex | Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions: Worst-case and Expectation Optimization Abstract Drutsa and Vanunts.pdf |
If you have any questions please contact the conference manager Xenia Adaeva via xadaeva@hse.ru.