• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

Summer School "Game Theory: Applications, Networks, Emotions", July 5-6, 2019

Photos on Google Drive

On July, 5-6, the International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making organized the International Summer School on 
Game Theory: Applications, Networks, Emotions.
The School was oriented to PhD students, graduate students, and young researchers and gave an introduction to design problems where the methodologies of economics and computer science interact successfully.


Summer School 2019 Program (PDF, 90 Kb)

Our lecturers:

Eyal Winter (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): Game Theory and Emotions
Abstract: I shall discuss several solution concepts that extend the notion of Nash equilibrium and incorporate emotions and moral sentiments in game theoretic models. I will address the role of “Rule Rationality” and “Biased Beliefs” as a commitment device that offers strategic advantages. I will discuss the relationships between these concepts and standard equilibrium notions such as correlated equilibrium.
Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute): Implementation in undominated strategies via bounded mechanisms
Abstract: weblink
Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University): An overview of prophet inequalities and their applications
Abstract: I shall discuss prophet inequalities and the role they play in the design and analysis of near-optimal posted price mechanisms. The talk will emphasize key results (both old and new) and will be elementary.
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research): How to maximize profit when selling multiple items?
Abstract: A seller of goods often does not know how much the buyer would be willing to pay for each of her goods. How should she, therefore, sell her items when aiming to maximize profit? When there is only one item for sale, there is a simple deterministic mechanism that maximizes the seller’s profit, but in contrast, recent results show that profit-maximizing mechanisms for selling multiple items are very complex, must use lotteries, and moreover, might have to present infinitely many lotteries for the buyer to choose from. The talk will present a simple deterministic mechanism whose profit is not significantly degraded compared to the complex profit-maximizing optimal mechanism. The talk will also survey several other results regarding the complexity of mechanisms that are almost optimal, and regarding optimal deterministic mechanisms.
Francis Bloch (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): The value of social networks
Abstract: Social networks can be used to disseminate information about new products, spread rumors or extract information. The lecture will discuss different ways in which a third party can exploit a social network to maximize profits, influence elections to or learn about individual characteristics.

Anna Bogomolnaia (HSE, University of Glasgow)  
Herve Moulin (HSE, University of Glasgow) 
Alexander Nesterov (HSE) 
Fedor Sandomirskiy (HSE, Technion) 
Constantine Sorokin (HSE, University of Glasgow)

The Summer School preceded the conference on Economic Design and Algorithms in St Petersburg (July 8-9, 2019)


Xenia Adaeva xeniya.adayeva@gmail.com


Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!
To be used only for spelling or punctuation mistakes.