Research Seminar on April 24, 2017

Topic: Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once
Speaker: Arkadi Predtetchinski (Maastricht University), joint work with Kutay Cingiz, Janos Flesch and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
The workshop will take place at 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 358 (3rd floor) at 16:50.

Abstract: We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency–based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect epsilon–equilibrium for small positive values of epsilon. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect epsilon–equilibrium.

The aim of the seminar is to discuss the work in progress,
yours and others ideas, which can be interesting.

If you want to give a talk at the future seminars, please, contact Fedor Sandomirskiy: sandomirski@yandex.ru , +7(921)633-23-53