Research Seminar on February 7: Nick Gravin (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
Topic: Correlation-robust mechanism design
Date & Time: February 7, 2019 at 16.50
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 346
Date & Time: February 7, 2019 (Thursday) at 16.50
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room TBA
Topic: Correlation-robust mechanism design
Speaker: Nick Gravin (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
Language: English
Abstract:
In this talk we will discuss the correlation-robust framework proposed by Carroll [Econometrica 2017] and our recent developments [SODA 2018,2019]. In this framework, the seller only knows marginal distributions for each separate item and/or individual bidder but has no information about correlation across different items or different bidders in the joint distribution. Any mechanism is then evaluated according to its expected profit in the worst-case, over all possible joint distributions with given marginal distributions. We illustrate the correlation-robust framework in the context of two well studied revenue maximization settings: (i) single-item action with correlated bidders and (ii) multi-item monopoly problem with a single additive buyer. In the first setting, a single item is sold via sealed-bid auction to n bidders with potentially interdependent (correlated) values for the good. In the second setting, a monopolist seller has n heterogeneous items to sell to a single buyer with additive value for the items.
Based on joint work with Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Tang, Xiaohui Bei.
Everyone interested is invited!