Research seminar on June, 25: Sergei Balakin (Ohio State University)

Topic: Decentralized Two-Period Matching
Date & Time: June, 25 at 15.00
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 339

International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making  invites you to participate in a research seminar.
On July, 4, Sergei Balakin (Ohio State University, USA) will give a talk on Decentralized Two-Period Matching

Date & Time: June, 25 (Tuesday), 15.00 
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 339

Abstract:

We consider a two-period decentralized matching in a two-sided market of employers and employees (universities and students). Because of dynamics, asymmetry, and private information, we can observe delays and coordination failures even in a simple case of two agents from each side. For this, we obtained conditions for different strategies to be in equilibrium. Also, the paradox called "threat of reject" is discovered: under some values of parameters, the higher number of options for employees may surprisingly lead to worse payos. This problem, along with miscoordination and delays, may be solved by signaling which turns a dynamic problem into a static one and makes the matching stable. In general case, we obtain sufficient conditions for assortative matching to be and not to be in equilibrium.

No registration.
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