St.Petersburg Economic seminar (HSE, EU, PDMI) on November, 14: Mikhail Panov (HSE St.Petersburg)

Topic: Agreements in Continuous Time
Date & Time: November, 14; 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)

We invite you to participate in the St.Petersburg Economic seminar (HSE, EU, PDMI) on November, 14.

Mikhail Panov (HSE SPb) will give a talk on Agreements in Continuous Time.

Time: 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)

Abstract: I propose a way to formulate and solve for subgame perfect equilibria of continuous-time games with both observable and unobservable actions. The main idea is to study directly self-enforcing agreements corresponding to the interaction, without setting up the full extensive-form game. 
To discipline the frequency of observable deviations, I impose an inertia restriction that makes the deviator stuck with his action for a small amount of time. Depending on an application, I consider two types of inertia. Under hard inertia, upon detecting a deviation, the other players are stuck with their previously intended actions for a small period of time as well. Under soft inertia, the other players can react to a deviation immediately.
To illustrate the method and to show its tractability, I consider several examples of continuous-time games from the existing literature.


Calendar: https://tinyurl.com/spbecon
Research seminar webpage: https://spb.hse.ru/en/scem/ilgt/hse-eusp-seminar