St.Petersburg Economic seminar (HSE, EU, PDMI) on April, 1: Alexander Nesterov (HSE)
Topic: Measuring Manipulations In Matching Markets By Counting Manipulating Agents
Date & Time: April, 1; 18:00 - 19:00
Where: online platform Zoom
Time: 18:00 - 19:00
Abstract: Due to various objectives and constraints, many real life matching markets are vulnerable to preference and capacity misreports. A large amount of such “manipulations” poses a serious threat to the success of these markets. To address this issue, numerous matching systems have recently reformed their matching rules. Examples include the entry-level medical labor market in the US, school admissions systems in New York City, Chicago, Denver, Ghana and England. We use a simple method of counting the number of all relevant manipulating agents and show that these reforms reduced the amount of manipulations.
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