GT Lab Internal Seminar on November, 8: Sofia Rubtsova

Title: Optimal pricing and matching policy on two-sided platforms in the presence of disintermediation
Speaker: Sofia Rubtsova, HSE
Date & Time: November 8; 15.00
Where: Kantemirovskaya str 3/1, 5th floor

Sofia Rubtsova (HSE) will give a talk on Optimal pricing and matching policy on two-sided platforms in the presence of disintermediation.

Time: 15.00
Abstract: I study the problem of disintermediation on two-sided matching platforms induced by repeated interactions between buyers and sellers. After a match is created on a platform, both parties may choose to conduct future transactions off the platform to evade commissions. I study how the platform responds to this problem by adjusting its pricing and matching tools in order to maximize revenue. If the platform has unrestricted options for choosing matching quality, it can only partially prevent disintermediation by offering subscriptions or reduced future per-transaction fees. However, if the pricing policy is limited to commissions only, it can be optimal to fully prevent disintermediation by adjusting the quality of matching over time. Finally, when the platform's matching ability is positively related to the market thickness, either full or partial disintermediation prevention can be optimal.