GT Lab Internal Seminar on November 15: Yuliya Veselova

Title: Manipulation of voters of different levels of the cognitive hierarchy under incomplete information
Speaker: Yuliya Veselova, HSE
Date & Time: November,15; 15.00
Where: Kantemirovskaya str 3/1, 5th floor

Yuliya Veselova (HSE) will give a talk on Manipulation of voters of different levels of the cognitive hierarchy under incomplete information.

Time: 15.00
Abstract: Under conditions of incomplete information, the voter has an incentive to manipulate with the chosen strategy if its use will not worsen the result in any profile of the voter's information set and at least in one will improve it. Uncertainty caused only by incomplete information is not an obstacle to manipulation if the outcome can be computed from the available information. However, if along with incomplete information there is uncertainty about the actions of other voters, the situation changes.The strategy chosen without taking into account the actions of others will be called a naive strategy of manipulation. In contrast, we also consider the behavior of a voter of the k-th level of the cognitive hierarchy, who chooses a strategy thinking that all other voters can act as representatives of levels up to k-1.

The paper will present theoretical results and computations of the probability that the naive strategy works in the case where other participants can also be manipulated. And also the probability that there is any strategy for voters at higher levels of the cognitive hierarchy under conditions of incomplete information.