GT Lab Internal Seminar on March, 6: Anna Bogomolnaia
Title: Ex Ante Fair Division
Speaker:Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow
Date & Time: March, 6; 15.00
Where: Kantemirovskaya str 3/1, 5th floor
Time: 15.00
Abstract: At the ex ante stage where individual characteristics (preferences, efforts, demands, endowments, rights, etc.) are not yet discussed, the role of the Ex Ante regulator is limited to stake out the worst and best welfare a participant can achieve, as a function only of their own characteristics. By minimizing the range from best to worst welfare of each participant, it keeps the outcome of face to face bargaining within normatively meaningful bounds: if the unsupervised agents fail to reach an agreement within the posted range, it steps in to implement an outcome that does.
Ex Ante lower and upper bounds on welfare as just described go back to the cake-cutting model in the 1940s and pervade the following axiomatic literature on fair division. In a general fair division model with transferable utilities, we introduce a methodology to describe the options of the Ex Ante regulator - its normative choice. We solve several iconic fair division problems, including the allocation of indivisible goods or costly chores and the exploitation of a commons. As well as two person problems where the surplus is a modular function.