Семинар лаборатории теории игр и принятия решений, 25 июня: Jackie Zhang

Title: Optimal incentives for innovation adoption
Presenter: Jackie Zhang, Assistant Professor at Xiamen University
Date & Time: June 25, 1 PM
Where: Kantemirovskaya str 3/1, 5th floor

We are pleased to invite you to participate in our Internal Seminar taking place on June 25, 2024.

Jackie Zhang, Assistant Professor at Xiamen University will give a talk on Optimal incentives for innovation adoption.

Abstract: We study innovation adoption as a social experimentation process featuring payoff externalities. Mass adoption generates signals reflecting the quality of the innovation and influences the flow payoff for the non-adopters. With positive externality, there exists a unique gradual equilibrium slower than the social optimum due to both payoff free-riding and informational free-riding. Reducing externality improves social welfare. With negative externality, depending on the learning potential, both the equilibrium and social optimum can either jump or be gradual, and multiple equilibria emerge. Coordinating towards the slowest equilibrium enhances social welfare.

 

We look forward to seeing you!