Research Seminar on March, 12: Vladyslav Nora (Nazarbayev University)

Topic: Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms
Date & Time: March 12, 2019, 16:50
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 358

International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making  invites you to participate in a research seminar.

Date & Time: March 12, 2019 (Tuesday) 16.50 - 18.10
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 358
Topic: Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms (with Olivier Tercieux and Julien Combe)
Speaker: Vladyslav Nora (Nazarbayev University)
Language: English


Abstract:
We consider a problem of allocating objects to agents over a sequence of periods and without monetary transfers. This situation commonly arises when assigning courses to students, jobs to teachers, workers to shifts etc. While agents may have arbitrary complementarities in preferences over sequences of dynamic assignments, mechanisms observed in practice are often static. In an environment with a continuum of agents and ordinal preferences, we show that any incentive compatible and ordinally efficient assignment can be achieved by a sequence of spot markets. Hence, the focus on static mechanisms may be without loss in dynamic problems.

Everyone interested is invited!

Follow this link to our calendar: https://tinyurl.com/spbecon