Title: School choice problem with externalities, weak strategic properties of decision mechanisms on the example of a rank-minimizing algorithmPresenter: Andrei V. Belykh, University of Naples Federico IIDate & Time: June 24, 2 PMWhere: Kantemirovskaya str 3/1, 5th floor
Тема: Проблема выбора школы с экстерналиями, слабые стратегические свойства механизмов решения на примере ранг-минимизирующего алгоритма
Докладчик: Андрей Белых, University of Naples Federico II
Дата и время: 24 июня, 14.00
Место: Кантемировская 3/1, 5 этаж
We are pleased to invite you to participate in our Internal Seminar taking place on June 24, 2024.
Andrei V. Belykh, University of Naples Federico II will give a talk on School choice problem with externalities, weak strategic properties of decision mechanisms on the example of a rank-minimizing algorithm.
Abstract:
The problem of school choice is the placement of students in preference-based school places, and is a real-world problem in many countries. Mechanisms to solve this problem can be either efficient or minimize justified envy (stable). The two properties are incompatible. In an environment with externalities, stability ceases to exist. Focusing on efficient mechanisms it is interesting to know their strategic properties. The most promising rank-minimizing algorithm is not strategy-proof, but it has the weaker strategic property of non-obvious manipulability even in an environment with externalities, which is our main result. A rank-minimizing algorithm is not regret-free when telling the truth, but is conditionally free when the agent does not receive the worst outcome for him as a result of the algorithm. The second significant result is the relationship between non-obvious manipulability and freedom from regret when telling the truth. The latter is a sufficient condition for the former, but non-obvious manipulability is not a sufficient condition for the property of freedom from regret when telling the truth.