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Научный семинар 21 января: Михаил Панов (New York University)

Тема: Costly Public Transfers in Repeated Cooperation under Imperfect Monitoring
Дата и время: 21 января 2019 года (понедельник), 16:50
Место: ул. Кантемировская, д.3 к.1 лит.А, ауд. 346

Международная лаборатория теории игр и принятия решений приглашает принять участие в научном семинаре по экономике.

Дата и время: 21 января 2019 года (понедельник), 16:50
Место: ул. Кантемировская, д.3 к.1 лит.А, ауд.346
Тема: Costly Public Transfers in Repeated Cooperation under Imperfect Monitoring
Докладчик: Михаил Панов (New York University)

Рабочий язык: английский

Аннотация:
We consider a two-player continuous-time repeated strategic interaction with imperfect monitoring
of hidden production and the possibility that players can make public transfers between
each other. Money transfers are costly: only a fraction k < 1 of the money sent is received
by the recipient (the case k=0 corresponds to pure money burning). We introduce the notion
of self-enforcing public agreement which mimics the notion of pure-strategy public perfect
equilibrium from the discrete time. For a fixed interest rate r > 0, we characterize the set of
payoffs attainable in self-enforcing public agreements, as well as the dynamics in the efficient
agreements. We show that adding the possibility of costly transfers increases the set of attainable
payoffs, because it allows one to provide incentives to one player with less cost to the other
player. We also show that costly transfers are used rarely and only after extreme histories when
promised continuation payoffs hit players’ individual rationality constraints.

Panov and Vorontsov - Costly Transfers.pdf


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