Избранные публикации

2024

1. Игнатьев А. А., Dementiev Y., Belova T. и др. How to Guide a Present-Biased Agent Through Prescribed Tasks? // 27th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 19–24 October 2024, Santiago de Compostela, Spain – Including 13th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2024). 

2. Vasilyeva E., Самойленко И. А., Kovalenko K. и др. Matrix centrality for annotated hypergraphs // Chaos, Solitons and Fractals. doi

3. Нестеров А. С., Минибаев К. Р., Ломакин А. С. Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students // Economics Letters. 2024. No. 237. Article 111647. doi

5. Sokolov M.V. NPV, IRR, PI, PP, and DPP: A unified view // Journal of Mathematical Economics 2024. doi

6. Нестеров А. С., Роспускова О. Д., Рубцова С. В. Robustness to manipulations in school choice // Social Choice and Welfare. doi

7. Morozov N., Игнатьев А. А., Dementiev Yuriy Several Stories about High-Multiplicity EFx Allocation (Student Abstract) // Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence: IAAI-24, EAAI-24, AAAI-24 Student Abstracts, Undergraduate Consortium and Demonstrations. doi

8. Vasily Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov и др. The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma // Games and Economic Behavior 2024. doi

9. Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Яновский Е. А. Veto Core Consistent Preference Aggregation // AAMAS '24: Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. doi

2023

1. Gusev V. Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem // European Journal of Operational Research. 2023. Vol. 305. No. 1. P. 438-450. doi

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2.  Vasilyeva E., Romance M., Samoylenko I. Distances in Higher-Order Networks and the Metric Structure of Hypergraphs // Entropy. 2023. Vol. 25. No. 6.  

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3.  Kondratiev A., Yanovskii E., Nesterov A. How Should We Score Athletes and Candidates: Geometric Scoring Rules // Operations Research. 2023. P. 1-19.  

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4.  Dietzenbacher B., Kondratev A. Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitions // Management Science. 2023. Vol. 69.No. 6. P. 1-21. doi

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5.  Nesterov A., Minibaev K., Lomakin A. Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students // Economics Letters. 2023.    

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6.  Kuzyutin D., Smirnova N. A dynamic multicriteria game of renewable resource extraction with environmentally concerned players // Economics Letters. 2023. Vol.226.  

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7.  Gusev V. Pure Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Step Pricing Game: Covering a Tourist City with Retail Outlets //Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics 2023 Vol. 17 No. 1 P. 72-85.  

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8. Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S. Incentives In Matching Markets: Counting And Comparing Manipulating Agents // Theoretical Economics. 2022. P. 1-31. 

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2022

1.  Kondratiev A., Nesterov A. Minimal envy and popular matchings // European Journal of Operational Research 2022 Vol. 296 No. 3 P. 776-787 

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2.  Suzdaltsev A.  Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions // Journal of Economic Theory 2022 Vol. 206 Article 105555  

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3. Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F. On the Fair Division of a Random Object  // Management Science. 2022. Vol. 68. No. 2. P. 1174-1194. doi
   

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4.  Гусев В. Чистое равновесие Нэша в двух-шаговой игре ценообразования: покрытие торговых точек в туристическом городе // Дискретный анализ и исследование операций. 2022. Т.30. №1. С. 5-27. 

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5. Gusev V. Cooperative congestion games: existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure // Optimization Letters. 2022. Vol. 16. No. 9. P. 2787-2801. doi
   

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6.  Yanovskaya E. B., Dietzenbacher B. The equal split-off set for NTU-games // Mathematical Social Sciences. 2022. P. 1-7. doi

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   2021
   

   1. Bednar J., Obersteiner M., Baklanov A., Thomson M., Wagner F., Geden O., Allen M., Hall J. W. Operationalizing the net-negative carbon economy // Nature. 2021. No. 596. P. 377-383.
      

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   2. Baklanov A., Garimidi P., Gkatzelis V., Schoepflin D. Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. С. 5143-5150. 

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   3. Ivanov D., Egorov V., Shpilman A. Balancing Rational and Other-Regarding Preferences in Cooperative-Competitive Environments, in: AAMAS'2021: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.: IFAAMAS, 2021. С. 1536-1538. 

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   4. Kalinin N. Pattern formation and tropical geometry // Frontiers in Physics. 2020. Vol. 8.
      

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   5. Kondratev A., Nesterov A. S. Minimal envy and popular matchings  // European Journal of Operational Research. 2022. Vol. 296. No. 3. P. 776-787.
      

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   6. Ianovski E., Kondratev A. Computing the Proportional Veto Core, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. С. 5489-5496. 

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   7. Arieli I., Babichenko Y., Sandomirskiy F., Tamuz O. Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs // Journal of Political Economy. 2021. Vol. 129. No. 9. P. 2546-2594. doi

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   8.  Laurent F., Schneider M., Scheller C., Watson J., Li Jiaoyang, Chen Z., Zheng Y., Chan S., Махнев К. И., Svidchenko O., Егоров В. С., Ivanov D., Shpilman A., Spirovska E., Tanevski O., Nikov A., Grunder R., Galevski D., Mitrovski J., Sartoretti G., Luo Zhiyao, Damani M., Bhattacharya N., Agarwal S., Egli A., Nygren E., Mohanty S. Flatland Competition 2020: MAPF and MARL for Efficient Train Coordination on a Grid World, in: Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.: PMLR, 2021. С. 275-301.

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   9. Ben-Porat O., Sandomirskiy F., Tennenholtz M. Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness, in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. С. 5176-5184.

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   10.  Meir R., Sandomirskiy F., Tennenholtz M. Representative Committees of Peers  // Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 2021. Vol. 71. P. 401-429.
       

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   11. Gusev V. Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure  // European Journal of Operational Research. 2021. Vol. 295. No. 3. P. 1180-1188. doi

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       12. Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S. Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility  // Theoretical Economics. 2021. No. 16(3). P. 881-909. doi

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   2020
   
   1. Dietzenbacher B., Yanovskaya E. B. Consistency of the equal split-off set // International Journal of Game Theory. 2020. 
      

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   2. Albizuri M.J., Dietzenbacher B., Zarzuelo J.M. Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims // Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 91, 2020, P. 11-17.
      

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   3. Gusev V. The vertex cover game: Application to transport networks // Omega, Volume 97, 2020.
      

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   4. Béal S., Deschamps M., Moulin, H. Taxing congestion of the space commons // Acta Astronautica, Volume 177, 2020, P. 313-319.
      

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   5. Kalinin N., Vershinin M. Strategic analysis of the Russian crab quota auction in 2019 // Marine Policy, Volume 122, 2020.
      

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   6. Dietzenbacher B., Estévez-Fernández A., Borm P.,  Hendrickx R. Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility //  Ann Oper Res,  2020.
      

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   7. Mazalov V., Gusev V. Generating functions and Owen value in cooperative network cover game // Performance Evaluation, Volume 144, 2020.
      

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   8. Arieli I., Babichenko Y., Sandomirskiy F., and Tamuz O. Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs // Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC '20), 2020.
      

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   2019
   
   1. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare //  ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation . 2019. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 1-32. doi
      
   2. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Hendrickx R. A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games // Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2019. P. 1-25. doi   (in press)
   3. Dietzenbacher B., Borm P., Arantza E. NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle // Review of Economic Design. 2019. P. 1-22. doi
      
   4. Kondratev A.Y., Nesterov A. S. Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules // Public Choice. 2019. P. 1-24. doi 
   5. Moulin H., Bogomolnaia A., Aziz H. Fair Mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences // Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'19), 2019. P. 753-781. doi
   6. Moulin H. Fair Division in the Internet Age //  Annual Review of Economics . 2019. Vol. 11. P. 407-441. doi
   7. Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F., Yanovskaya E. B. Dividing bads under additive utilities //  Social Choice and Welfare . 2019. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 395-417. doi
   8. Ianovski E., Wilson M. C. Manipulability of consular election rules //  Social Choice and Welfare . 2019. Vol. 2. No. 52. P. 363-393. doi
   9. Kondratev A., Мазалов В. В. Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory  //   International Journal of Game Theory . 2019. P. 1-27.  doi
   10. Ivanov D., Nesterov A. S. Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach // Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'19), 2019. doi
       

   
   2018
   

   1. Hougaard J., Moulin H.  Sharing the cost of risky projects  // Economic Theory. 2018. Vol. 65. No. 3. P. 663-679. doi
   2. Kreps V. L., Gavrilovich M.  Games with symmetric incomplete information and asymmetric computational resources  //  International Game Theory Review. 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 1-16.  doi
   3. Zseleva A., Flesch J., Vermeulen D. Catch Games - The impact of modeling decisions //  International Journal of Game Theory . 2018
   4. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare //  ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation . 2018
   5. Zseleva A., Ifrach B., Maglaras C., Scarsini M. Bayesian Social Learning from Consumer Reviews // Operations Research. 2018

    

   
   2017
   

   1. Bogomolnaia A.,  Moulin H. ,  Sandomirskiy F.,  Yanovskaya E. B.   Competitive division of a mixed manna // Econometrica. 2017. Vol. 85. No. 6. P. 1847-1871. doi
   2. Sandomirskiy F. On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values //  Dynamic Games and Applications . 2018. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 180-198. doi
   3. Nesterov A. S. Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms //  Journal of Economic Theory  . 2017. No. 170. P. 145-168. doi
   4. Bogomolnaia A. The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules //  Journal of Public Economic Theory . 2018. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 271-276.  

    

   
   2016
   
   

   1.  Moulin H.  Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing  // Journal of Economic Theory . 2016. Vol. 162. P. 1-20. doi
   2. Moulin H., Caragiannis I., Kurokawa D., Procaccia A. D., Shah N., Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare // Proceeding of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'16), 2016. doi
   3. Яновская Е. Б.Самоковариантные и согласованные решения кооперативных игр с трансферабельными полезностями // Математическая теория игр и ее приложения. 2016. Т. 8. № 3. С. 100-133.